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Abstract
We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols,
bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we
prove that:
1. BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end
of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)].
2. BA protocols resilient against n/4 corruptions terminate at the end of the second round with
probability at most 1−Θ(1).
3. For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible
combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate
at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1/2 + o(1)].
The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infra-
structure (PKI).
The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS’17) that tolerates up to
n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability.
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1 Introduction
Byzantine agreement (BA) [56, 43] is one of the most important problems in theoretical
computer science. In a BA protocol, a set of n parties wish to jointly agree on one of the
honest parties’ input bits. The protocol is t-resilient if no set of t corrupted parties can
collude and prevent the honest parties from completing this task. In the closely related
problem of broadcast, all honest parties must agree on the message sent by a (potentially
corrupted) sender. Byzantine agreement and broadcast are fundamental building blocks
in distributed computing and cryptography, with applications in fault-tolerant distributed
systems [14, 42], secure multiparty computation [60, 33, 7, 15], and more recently, blockchain
protocols [16, 31, 55].
In this work, we consider the synchronous communication model, where the protocol
proceeds in rounds. It is well known that in the plain model, without any trusted setup
assumptions, BA and broadcast can be solved if and only if t < n/3 [56, 43, 26, 30]. Assuming
the existence of digital signatures and a public-key infrastructure (PKI), BA can be solved
in the honest-majority setting t < n/2, and broadcast under any number of corruptions
t < n [23]. Information-theoretic variants that remain secure against computationally
unbounded adversaries exist using information-theoretic pseudo-signatures [57].
An important aspect of BA and broadcast protocols is their round complexity. Determ-
inistic t-resilient protocols require at least t + 1 rounds [25, 23], which is a tight lower
bound [23, 30]. The breakthrough results of Ben-Or [6] and Rabin [58] showed that this
limitation can be circumvented using randomization. In particular, Rabin [58] used random
beacons (common random coins that are secret-shared among the parties in a trusted setup
phase) to construct a BA protocol resilient to t < n/4 corruptions. Rabin’s protocol fails
with probability 2−r after r rounds, and requires expected constant number of rounds to reach
agreement. This line of research culminated with the work of Feldman and Micali [24] who
showed how to compute the common coins from scratch, yielding expected-constant-round
BA protocol in the plain model, resilient to t < n/3 corruptions. Katz and Koo [40] gave
an analogue result in the PKI-model for the honest-majority case. Recent results used
trusted setup and cryptographic assumptions to establish a surprisingly small expected round
complexity, namely 9 for t < n/3 [47] and 10 for t < n/2 [49, 2].
The expected-constant-round protocols mentioned above are guaranteed to terminate
(with negligible error probability) within a poly-logarithmic number of rounds. The lower
bounds on the guaranteed termination from [25, 23] were generalized by [18, 39], showing
that any randomized r-round protocol must fail with probability at least (c · r)−r for some
constant c. However, to date there is no lower bound on the expected round complexity of
randomized BA.
In this work, we tackle this question and show new lower bounds for randomized BA. To
make the discussion more informative, we consider a more explicit definition that bounds
the halting probability within a specific number of rounds. A lower bound based on such a
definition readily implies a lower bound on the expected round complexity of the BA protocol.
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1.1 The Model
We start with describing in more details the model in which our lower bounds are given. In
the BA protocols considered in this work, the parties are communicating over a synchronous
network of private and authenticated channels. Each party starts the protocol with an input
bit and upon completion decides on an output bit. The protocol is t-resilient if when facing
t colluding parties that attack the protocol it holds that: (1) all honest parties agree on the
same output bit (agreement), and (2) if all honest parties start with the same input bit, then
this is the common output bit (validity). The protocols might have a trusted setup phase: a
trusted external party samples correlated values and distributes them between the parties.
A setup phase is known to be essential for tolerating t ≥ n/3 corruptions, and seems to be
crucial for highly efficient protocols such as [47, 16, 49, 2, 1]. The trusted setup phase is
typically implemented using (heavy) secure multiparty computation [10, 12], via a public-key
infrastructure, or with a random oracle (that can be used to model proof of work) [54].
Locally consistent adversaries. The attacks presented in the paper require very limited
capabilities from the corrupted parties (a limitation that makes our bounds stronger).
Specifically, a corrupted party might (1) prematurely abort, and (2) send messages to
different parties based on differing input bits and/or incoming messages from other corrupted
parties. We emphasize that corrupted parties sample their random coins honestly (and use
the same coins for all messages sent). In addition, they do not lie about messages received
from honest parties.
Public-randomness protocols. In many randomized protocols, including all those used in
practice, cryptography is merely used to provide message authentication – preventing a party
from lying about the messages it received – and verifiable randomness – forcing the parties
to toss their coins correctly. The description of such protocols can be greatly simplified if
only security against locally consistent adversaries is required (in which corrupted parties
do not lie about their coin tosses and their incoming messages from honest parties). This
motivates the definition of public-randomness protocols, where each party publishes its local
coin tosses for each round (the party’s first message also contains its setup parameter, if such
exists). Although our attacks apply to arbitrary BA protocols, we show even stronger lower
bounds for public-randomness protocols.
We illustrate the simplicity of the model by considering the BA protocol of Micali [47].
In this protocol, the cryptographic tools, digital signatures and verifiable random functions
(VRFs),1 are used to allow the parties elect leaders and toss coins with probability 2/3 as
follows: each party Pi in round r evaluates the VRF on the pair (i, r) and multicasts the
result. The leader is set to be the party with the smallest VRF value, and the coin is set to
be the least-significant bit of this value. Since these values are uniformly distributed κ-bit
strings (κ is the security parameter), and there are at least 2n/3 honest parties, the success
probability is 2/3. (Indeed, with probability 1/3, the leader is corrupted, and can send its
value only to a subset of the parties, creating disagreement.)
When considering locally consistent adversaries, Micali’s protocol can be significantly
simplified by having each party randomly sample and multicast a uniformly distributed κ-bit
string (cryptographic tools and setup phase are no longer needed). Corrupted parties can
still send their values to a subset of honest parties as before, but they cannot send different
random values to different honest parties.
1 A pseudorandom function that provides a non-interactively verifiable proof for the correctness of its
output.
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A similar simplification applies to other BA protocols that are based on leader election
and coin tosses such as [24, 27, 40] (private channels are used for a leader-election sub-
protocol), [49, 2] (cryptography is used for coin-tossing and message-authentication), and
[16, 1] (cryptography is used to elect a small committee per round).2
I Proposition 1 (Malicious security to locally consistent public-randomness protocol, informal).
Each of the BA protocols of [24, 27, 40, 47, 16, 49, 2, 1] induces a public-randomness BA
protocol secure against locally consistent adversaries, with the same parameters.
A useful abstraction for protocol design. To complete the picture, we remark that security
against locally consistent adversaries, which may seem somewhat weak at first sight, can be
compiled using standard cryptographic techniques into security against arbitrary adversaries.
This reduction becomes lossless, efficiency-wise and security-wise, when applied to public-
randomness protocols. Thus, building public-randomness protocols secure against locally
consistent adversaries is a useful abstraction for protocol designers that want to use what
cryptography has to offer, but without being bothered with the technical details.
Connection to the full-information model. The public-randomness model can be viewed
as a restricted form of the full-information model [17, 8, 32, 5, 9, 35, 38, 44, 41, 45]. In
the latter model, the adversary is computationally unbounded and has complete access to
all the information in the system, i.e., it can listen to all transmitted messages and view
the internal states of honest parties (such an adversary is also called intrusive [17]). One
of the motivations to study full-information protocols is to separate randomization from
cryptography and see to what extent randomization alone can speed up Byzantine agreement.
Bar-Joseph and Ben-Or [5] showed that any full-information BA protocol tolerating t = Θ(n)
adaptive, fail-stop corruptions (i.e., the adversary can dynamically choose which parties to
crash) runs for Ω˜(
√
n) rounds. Goldwasser et al. [35] constructed an O(logn)-round BA
protocol tolerating t = (1/3 − ε)n static, malicious corruptions, for an arbitrarily small
constant ε > 0.
We chose to state our results in the public-randomness model for two reasons. First,
our lower bounds readily extend to lower bounds in the full-information model (since
we consider weaker adversarial capabilities, e.g., all our attacks are efficient). Second,
when considering locally consistent adversaries, public-randomness captures essentially what
efficient cryptography has to offer. Indeed, all protocol used in practice can be cast as public-
randomness protocols tolerating locally consistent adversaries (Proposition 1) and every
public-randomness protocol secure against locally consistent adversaries can be compiled,
using cryptography, to malicious security in the standard model, where security relies on
secret coins (see Theorem 6 below).
We note that it is known how to compile certain full-information protocols and “boost”
their security from fail-stop into malicious; however, these compilers capture either determin-
istic protocols [36, 13, 52] or protocols with a non-uniform source of randomness (namely,
an SV-source [59]) [35]. It is unclear whether these compilers can be extended to capture
arbitrary protocols (this is in fact stated as an open question in [13, 35]). In addition, these
compilers are designed to be information theoretic and not rely on cryptography; thus, they
do not model highly efficient protocols used in practice.
2 Unlike the aforementioned protocols that use “simple” preprocess and “light-weight” cryptographic
tools, the protocol of Rabin [58] uses a heavy, per execution, setup phase (consisting of Shamir sharing
of a random coin for every potential round) that we do not know how to cast as a public-randomness
protocol.
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1.2 Our Results
We present three lower bounds on the halting probability of randomized BA protocols. To
keep the following introductory discussion simple, we will assume that both validity and
agreement properties hold perfectly, without error.
First-round halting. Our first result bounds the halting probability after a single com-
munication round. This is the simplest case since parties cannot inform each other about
inconsistencies they encounter. Indeed, the established lower bound is quite strong, showing
an exponentially small bound on the halting probability when t ≥ n/3, and exponentially
close to 1/2 when t ≥ n/4.
I Theorem 2 (First-round halting, informal). Let Π be an n-party BA protocol and let γ
denote the halting probability after a single communication round facing a locally consistent,
static, adversary corrupting t parties. Then,
t ≥ n/3 implies γ ≤ 2t−n for arbitrary protocols, and γ = 0 for public-randomness
protocols.
t ≥ n/4 implies γ ≤ 1/2+2t−n for arbitrary protocols, and γ ≤ 1/2 for public-randomness
protocols.
Note that the deterministic (t+ 1)-round, t-resilient BA protocol of Dolev and Strong [23]
can be cast as a locally consistent public-randomness protocol (in the plain model).3 The-
orem 2 shows that for n = 3 and t = 1, this two-round BA protocol is essentially optimal
and cannot be improved via randomization (at least without considering complex protocols
that cannot be cast as public-randomness protocols).
Second-round halting for arbitrary protocols. Our second result considers the halting
probability after two communication rounds. This is a much more challenging regime,
as honest parties have time to detect inconsistencies in first-round messages. Our bound
for arbitrary protocols in this case is weaker, and shows that when t > n/4, the halting
probability is bounded away from 1.
I Theorem 3 (Second-round halting, arbitrary protocols, informal). Let Π be an n-party BA
protocol and let γ denote the halting probability after two communication rounds facing a
locally consistent, static, adversary corrupting t = (1/4 + ε) · n parties. Then, γ ≤ 1− (ε/5)2.
Second-round halting for public-randomness protocols. Theorem 3 bounds the second-
round halting probability of arbitrary BA protocols away from one. For public-randomness
protocol we achieve a much stronger bound. The attack requires adaptive corruptions (as
opposed to static corruptions in the previous case) and is based on a combinatorial conjecture
that is stated below.4
3 When considering locally consistent adversaries, the impossibility of BA for t ≥ n/3 does not apply.
4 The attack holds even without assuming Conjecture 5 when considering strongly adaptive corruptions [34],
in which an adversary sees all messages sent by honest parties in any given round and, based on the
messages’ content, decides whether to corrupt a party (and alter its message or sabotage its delivery) or
not. Similarly, the conjecture is not required if each party is limited to tossing a single unbiased coin.
These extensions are not formally proved in this paper.
DISC 2019
12:6 On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement
I Theorem 4 (Second-round halting, public-randomness protocols, informal). Let Π be an
n-party public-randomness BA protocol and let γ denote the halting probability after two
communication rounds facing a locally consistent adversary adaptively corrupting t parties.
Then, for sufficiently large n and assuming Conjecture 5 holds,
t > n/3 implies γ = 0.
t > n/4 implies γ ≤ 1/2.
Theorem 4 shows that for sufficiently large n, any public-randomness protocol tolerat-
ing t > n/3 locally consistent corruptions cannot halt in less than three rounds (unless
Conjecture 5 is false). In particular, its expected round complexity must be at least three.
To understand the meaning of this result, recall the protocol of Micali [47]. As discussed
above, this protocol can be cast as a public-randomness protocol tolerating t < n/3 adaptive
locally consistent corruptions. The protocol proceeds by continuously running a three-round
sub-protocol until halting, where each sub-protocol consists of a coin-tossing round, a check-
halting-on-0 round, and a check-halting-on-1 round. Executing a single instance of this
sub-protocol demonstrates a halting probability of 1/3 after three rounds. By Theorem 4,
a protocol that tolerates slightly more corruptions, i.e., (1/3 + ε) · n, for arbitrarily small
ε > 0, cannot halt in fewer rounds.
Our techniques. Our attacks follow the spirit of many lower bounds on the round complexity
on BA and broadcast [25, 23, 39, 22, 29, 4]. The underlying idea is to start with a configuration
in which validity assures the common output is 0, and gradually adjust it, while retaining
the same output value, into a configuration in which validity assures the common output is
1. (For the simple case of deterministic protocols, each step of the argument requires the
corrupted parties to lie about their input bits and incoming messages from other corrupted
parties, but otherwise behave honestly.) Our main contribution, which departs from the
aforementioned paradigm, is adding another dimension to the attack by aborting a random
subset of parties (rather than simply manipulating the input and incoming messages). This
change allows us to bypass a seemingly inherent barrier for this approach. We refer the
reader to Section 2 for a detailed overview of our attacks.
We remark that a similar approach was employed by Attiya and Censor [3] for obtaining
lower bounds on consensus protocols in the asynchronous shared-memory model, a flavor
of BA in a communication model very different to the one considered in the present paper.
Specifically, [3] showed that in an asynchronous shared-memory system, Θ(n2) steps are
required for n processors to reach agreement when facing Θ(n) computationally unbounded
strongly adaptive corruptions (see Footnote 4). Their adversary also aborts a subset of the
parties to prevent halting; however, the difference in communication model (synchronous in
our work, vs. asynchronous in [3]) and the adversary’s power (efficient and adaptive in our
work, vs. computationally unbounded and strongly adaptive in [3]) yields a very different
attack and analysis (though, interestingly, both attacks boil down to different variants of
isoperimetric-type inequalities).
The combinatorial conjecture. We conclude the present section by motivating and stating
the combinatorial conjecture assumed in Theorem 4, and discussing its plausibility. We believe
the conjecture to be of independent interest, as it relates to topics from Boolean functions
analysis such as influences of subsets of variables [53] and isoperimetric-type inequalities
[50, 51]. The nature of our conjecture makes the following paragraphs somewhat technical,
and reading them can be postponed until after going over the description of our attack
in Section 2.
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The analysis of our attack naturally gives rise to an isoperimetric-type inequality. For
limited types of protocols, we manage to prove it using Friedgut’s theorem [28] about
approximate juntas and the KKL theorem [37]. For arbitrary protocols, however, we only
manage to reduce our attack to the conjecture below.
We require the following notation before stating the conjecture. Let Σ denote some finite
set. For x ∈ Σn and S ⊆ [n], define the vector ⊥S(x) ∈ {Σ ∪ ⊥}n by assigning all entries
indexed by S with the value ⊥, and all other entries according to x. Finally, let Dn,σ denote
the distribution induced over subsets of [n] by choosing each element with probability σ
independently at random.
I Conjecture 5. For any σ, λ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that the following holds for large
enough n ∈ N: let Σ be a finite alphabet, and let A0,A1 ⊆ {Σ ∪ ⊥}n be two sets such that
for both b ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr
S←Dn,σ
[
Pr
r←Σn
[r,⊥S(r) ∈ Ab] ≥ λ
]
≥ 1− δ.
Then,
Pr
S←Dn,σ
r←Σn
[∀b ∈ {0, 1} : {r,⊥S(r)} ∩ Ab 6= ∅] ≥ δ.
Consider two large sets A0 and A1 which are “stable” in the following sense: for both
b ∈ {0, 1}, with probability 1− δ over S ← Dn,σ, it holds that both r and ⊥S(r) belong to
Ab, with probability at least λ over r. Conjecture 5 stipulates that with high probability
(≥ δ), the vectors r and ⊥S(r) lie in opposite sets (i.e., one is in A0 and the other A1−b), for
random r and S. It is somewhat reminiscent of the following flavor of isoperimetric inequality:
for any two large sets B0 and B1, taking a random element from B0 and resampling a few
coordinates, yields an element in B1 with large probability. Less formally, one can “move”
from one set to the other by manipulating a few coordinates [50, 51].
A few remarks are in order. First, it suffices for our purposes to show that δ is a noticeable
(i.e., inverse polynomial) function of n, rather than independent of n.5 We opted for the
latter as it gives a stronger attack. Second, the conjecture holds for “natural” sets such as
balls, i.e., A0 and A1 are balls centered around 0n and 1n of constant radius,6 and “prefix”
sets, i.e., sets of the form Ab = bk×{Σ ∪ ⊥}n−k. Furthermore, the claim can be proven when
the probabilities over S and r are reversed, i.e., “with probability λ over r, it holds that
both r and ⊥S(r) belong to Ab with probability at least 1− δ over S”, instead of the above.
Interestingly, this weaker statement boils down to the aforementioned isoperimetric-type
inequality (c.f. [50] for the Boolean case and [51] for the non Boolean case).
We conclude by pointing out that, as mentioned in Footnote 4, the conjecture is not
needed for certain limited cases that are not addressed in detail in the present paper. One
such case is sketched out in Section 2.
1.3 Locally Consistent Security to Malicious Security
As briefly mentioned in Section 1.1, protocols that are secure against locally consistent
adversaries can be compiled to tolerate arbitrary malicious adversaries. The compiler requires
a PKI for digital signatures and verifiable random functions (VRFs) [48]. A VRF is a
pseudorandom function with an additional property: using the secret key and an input x,
5 We remark that it is rather easy to show that δ ≥ 2−n, which is not good enough for our purposes.
6 The alphabet Σ is not necessarily Boolean, and there are a couple of subtleties in defining balls.
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the VRF outputs a pseudorandom value y along with a proof string pi; using the public key,
everyone can use pi to verify whether y is the output of x. We consider a trusted setup phase
for establishing the PKI, where every party generates keys for a VRF and for a signature
scheme, and publishes the corresponding public keys.
Given a protocol that is secure against locally consistent adversaries, the compiled protocol
proceeds as follows, round by round. Each party Pi sets its random coins for the r’th round
ρri (together with a proof piri ) by evaluating the VRF over the pair (i, r). Next, for every
j ∈ [n], party Pi uses these coins to compute the message mri→j for Pj , signs mri→j along
with the VRF proof piri as σri→j , and sends (mri→j , piri , σri→j) to Pj . Finally, Pi proves to each
Pj using a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that:
1. There exist an input bit b, random coins ρri , as well as random coins and incoming
messages ρr′i and (mr
′
1→i, . . . ,m
r′
n→i) for every r′ < r, such that: (1) piri verifies that ρri is
the VRF output of (i, r) (using the VRF public key of Pi), and (2) the message mri→j is
the output of the next-message function of Pi when applied to these values.
2. For every r′ < r, the input bit b and the random coins ρr′′i and incoming messages
(mr′′1→i, . . . ,mr
′′
n→i) for every r′′ < r′, are the same as those used to generate mr
′
i→j .
3. For r > 1, the messages received in the previous round are properly signed. That is,
for every k ∈ [n], there is a signature σr−1k→i of the message mr−1k→i that verifies under the
signature-verification key of Pk.
When considering public-randomness protocols, the above compilation can be made much
more efficient. Instead of proving in zero knowledge the consistency of each message, each
party Pi concatenates to each message all of its incoming messages from the previous round.
A receiver can now locally verify the coins used by Pi are the VRF output of (i, r) (as
assured by the VRF), that the incoming messages are properly signed, and that the message
is correctly generated from the internal state of Pi (which is now visible and verified).
I Theorem 6 (Locally consistent to malicious security, folklore, informal). Assume PKI for
digital signatures and VRF. Then, a BA protocol secure against locally consistent adversaries
can be compiled into a maliciously secure BA protocol with the same parameters, apart from
a constant blowup in the round complexity (no blowup for public-randomness protocols).
1.4 Additional Related Work
Following the work of Feldman and Micali [24] in the two-thirds majority setting, Katz
and Koo [40] improved the expected round complexity to 23, and Micali [47] to 9. In
the honest-majority setting, Fitzi and Garay [27] showed expected-constant-round protocol
and Katz and Koo [40] expected 56 rounds. Micali and Vaikuntanathan [49] adjusted the
technique from [47] to the honest-majority case. Abraham et al. [2] achieved expected 10
rounds assuming static corruptions and expected 16 rounds assuming adaptive corruptions.
Abraham et al. [1] constructed an expected-constant-round protocol tolerating (1/2− ) · n
adaptive corruptions with sublinear communication complexity. In the dishonest-majority
setting, Garay et al. [29] constructed a broadcast protocol with expected O(k) rounds,
tolerating t < n/2 + k corruptions.
Attiya and Censor-Hillel [4] extended the results of Chor et al. [18] and of Karlin and
Yao [39] on guaranteed termination of randomized BA protocols to the asynchronous setting,
and provided a tight lower bound.
Randomized protocols with expected constant round complexity have probabilistic termin-
ation, which requires delicate care with respect to composition (i.e., their usage as subroutines
by higher-level protocols). Parallel composition of randomized BA protocols was analyzed in
[6, 27], sequential composition in [46], and universal composition in [20, 19].
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1.5 Open Questions
Our attack on two-round halting of public-randomness protocols is based on Conjecture 5.
In this work we prove special cases of this conjecture, but proving the general case remains
an open challenge.
A different interesting direction is to bound the halting probability of protocols when
t < n/4. It is not clear how to extend our attacks to this regime.
2 Technical Overview
In this section, we outline our techniques for proving our results; we refer the reader to the
full version of the paper [21] for formal claims and complete proofs. We start with explaining
our bound for first-round halting of arbitrary protocols (Theorem 2). We then move to
second-round halting, starting with the weaker bound for arbitrary protocols (Theorem 3),
and then move to the much stronger bound for public-randomness protocols (Theorem 4).
Notations. We use calligraphic letters to denote sets, uppercase for random variables,
lowercase for values, boldface for vectors, and sans-serif (e.g., A) for algorithms (i.e., Turing
Machines). For n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, · · · , n} and (n) = {0, 1, · · · , n}. Let dist(x, y) denote the
hamming distance between x and y. For a set S ⊆ [n] let S = [n] \ S. For a set R ⊆ {0, 1}n,
let R|S = {xS ∈ {0, 1}|S| s.t. x ∈ R}, i.e., R|S is the projection of R on the index-set S.
Fix an n-party randomized BA protocol Π = (P1, . . . ,Pn). For presentation purposes, we
assume that validity and agreement hold perfectly, and consider no setup parameters (in the
subsequent sections, we remove these assumptions). Furthermore, we only address here the
case where the security threshold is t > n/3. The case t > n/4 requires an additional generic
step that we defer to the technical sections of the paper. We denote by Π(v; r) the output of
an honest execution of Π on input v ∈ {0, 1}n and randomness r (each party Pi holds input
vi and randomness ri). We let Π(v) denote the resulting random variable determined by the
parties’ random coins, and we write Π(v) = b to denote the event that the parties output
b in an honest execution of Π on input v. All corrupt parties described below are locally
consistent (see Section 1.1).
2.1 First-Round Halting
Assume the honest parties of Π halt at the end of the first round with probability γ > 0
when facing t corruptions (on every input). Our goal is to upperbound the value of γ. Our
approach is inspired by the analogous lower-bound for deterministic protocols (cf., [25, 23]).
Namely, we start with a configuration in which validity assures the common output is 0,
and, while maintaining the same output, we gradually adjust it into a configuration in which
validity assures the common output is 1, thus obtaining a contradiction. For randomized
protocols, the challenge is to maintain the invariant of the output, even when the probability
of halting is far from 1. We make the following observations:
Almost pre-agreement: dist(v, bn) ≤ t =⇒ Π(v) = b. (1)
That is, in an honest execution of Π, if the parties almost start with preagreement, i.e.,
with at least n− t of b’s in the input vector, then the parties output b with probability 1.
Equation 1 follows from agreement and validity by considering an adversary corrupting
exactly those parties with input vi 6= b, and otherwise not deviating from the protocol.
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Neighboring executions (N1): dist(v0,v1) ≤ t =⇒ Pr
r
[Π(v0; r) = Π(v1; r)] ≥ γ. (2)
That is, for two input vectors that are at most t-far (i.e., the resiliency threshold), the
probability that the executions on these vectors yield the same output when using the same
randomness is bounded below by the halting probability. To see why Equation 2 holds,
consider the following adversary corrupting subset C, for C being the set of indices where v
and v′ disagree. For an arbitrary partition {C0, C1} of C, the adversary instructs C to send
messages according to v0 to C0 and according to v1 to C1, respectively. With probability at
least γ, all parties halt at the first round, and, by perfect agreement, all parties compute the
same output.7 Since parties in Cb cannot distinguish this execution from a halting execution
of Π(vb; r), Equation 2 follows.
We deduce that if there are more than n/3 corrupt parties, then the halting probability
is 0; this follows by combining the two observations above for v0 = 0n−t1t and v1 = 0t1n−t.
Namely, by Equation 1, it holds that Prr [Π(v0; r) = Π(v1; r)] = 0. Thus, by Equation 2,
γ = 0.
2.2 Second-Round Halting – Arbitrary Protocols
We proceed to explain our bound for second-round halting of arbitrary protocols. Assume
the honest parties of Π halt at the end of the second round with probability γ > 0 when
facing t corruptions (on every input). Let t = (1/3 + ε) · n, for an arbitrary small constant
ε > 0. In spirit, the attack follows the footsteps of the single-round case described above; we
show that neighboring executions compute the same output with good enough probability
(related to the halting probability), and lower-bound the latter using the almost pre-agreement
observation. There is, however, a crucial difference between the first-round and second-round
cases; the honest parties can use the second round to detect whether (some) parties are
sending inconsistent messages. Thus, the second round of the protocol can be used to “catch-
and-discard” parties that are pretending to have different inputs to different parties, and so
our previous attack breaks down. (In the one-round case, we exploit the fact that the honest
parties cannot verify the consistency of the messages they received.) Still, we show that there
is a suitable variant of the attack that violates the agreement of any “too-good” scheme.
At a very high level, the idea for proving the neighboring property is to gradually increase
the set of honest parties towards which the adversary behaves according to v1 (for the
remainder it behaves according to v0, which is a decreasing set of parties). While the honest
parties might identify the attacking parties and discard their messages, they should still
agree on the output and halt at the conclusion of the second round with high probability.
We exploit this fact to show that at the two extremes (where the adversary is merely playing
honestly according to v0 and v1, respectively), the honest parties behave essentially the
same. Therefore, if at one extreme (for v0) the honest parties output b, it follows that they
also output b at the other extreme (for v1), which proves the neighboring property for the
second-round case.
7 In the above, we have chosen to ignore a crucial subtlety. In an execution of the protocol, it may be
the case that there is a suitable message (according to v0 or v1) to prevent halting, yet the adversary
cannot determine which one to send. In further sections, we address this issue by taking a random
partition of C (rather than an arbitrary one). By doing so, we introduce an error-term of 1/2n−t when
we upper bound the halting probability γ.
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We implement the above by augmenting the one-round attack as follows. In addition
to corrupting a set of parties that feign different inputs to different parties, the adversary
corrupts an extra set of parties that is inconsistent with regards to the messages it received
from the first set of corrupted parties. To distinguish between the two sets of corrupted
parties, the former (first) will be referred to as “pivot” parties (since they pivot their input)
and will be denoted P , and the latter will be referred to as “propagating” parties (since they
carefully choose what message to propagate at the second round) and will be denoted L. We
emphasize that the propagating parties deviate from the protocol only at the second round
and only with regards to the messages received by the pivot parties (not with regards to
their input – as is the case for the pivot parties). In more detail, we partition P = [n] \ P
into ` = d1/εe sets {L1, . . . ,L`}, and we show that, unless there exists i such that parties in
C = P ∪ Li violate agreement (explained below), the following must hold for neighboring
executions.
Neighbouring executions (N2): dist(v0,v1) ≤ n/3 =⇒ (3)
Pr [Π(v0) = b in two rounds] ≥ Pr [Π(v1) = b in two rounds]− 2(`+ 1)2 · (1− γ).
That is, for two input vectors that are at most n/3–far, the difference in probability that
two distinct executions (for each input vector) yield the same output within two rounds is
roughly upper-bounded by the quantity (1− γ)/ε2 (i.e., non-halting probability divided by
ε2). To see that Equation 3 holds true, fix v0,v1 ∈ {0, 1}n of hamming distance at most
n/3, and let P be the set of indices where v0 and v1 differ. Consider the following ` + 1
distinct variants of Π, denoted {Π0, . . . ,Π`}; in protocol Πi, parties in P send messages
to L1, . . . ,Li according to the input prescribed by v1 and to Li+1, . . . ,L` according to the
input prescribed by v0, respectively. All other parties follow the instructions of Π for input
v0. We write Πi = b to denote the event that the parties not in P output b. Notice that
the endpoint executions Π0 and Π` are identical to honest executions with input v0 and v1,
respectively. Let Halti denote the event that the parties not in P halt at the second round
in an execution of Πi. We point out that Pr [¬Halti] ≤ (`+ 1) · (1− γ), since otherwise the
adversary corrupting P and running Πi, for a random i ∈ (`) ..= {0, . . . , `}, prevents halting
with probability greater than 1− γ. Next, we inductively show that
Pr [Πi = b ∧ Halti] ≥ Pr [Π0 = b ∧ Halt0]− 2i · (`+ 1) · (1− γ), (4)
for every i ∈ (`), which yields the desired expression for i = `. In pursuit of contradiction,
assume Equation 4 does not hold, and let i denote the smallest index for which it does not
hold (observe that i 6= 0, by definition). Notice that
Pr [(Πi−1 = b ∧ Halti−1) ∧ (Πi 6= b ∧ Halti)]
≥ Pr [Πi−1 = b ∧ Halti−1]− Pr [Πi = b ∨ ¬Halti]
≥ Pr [Πi−1 = b ∧ Halti−1]− Pr [Πi = b ∧ Halti]− Pr [¬Halti]
> 2 · (`+ 1) · (1− γ)− Pr [¬Halti]
≥ (`+ 1) · (1− γ) > 0.
The second inequality follows from union bound and A ∨ ¬B ≡ (A ∧ B) ∨ ¬B, the third
inequality is by induction hypothesis, and the last inequality by the bound Pr [¬Halti] ≤
(`+ 1) · (1− γ).
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It follows that an adversary corrupting C = P ∪ Li causes disagreement with non-zero
probability by acting as follows: parties in P and Li send messages according to Πi and Πi−1
to C0 and C1, respectively, where {C0, C1} is an arbitrary partition of C = [n]\P∪Li. Since dis-
agreement is ruled out by assumption, we deduce Equations 4 and 3. To conclude, we combine
the almost pre-agreement property (Equation 1) with the neighboring property (Equation 3)
with v0 = 0n−t1t, v1 = 0t1n−t, and b = 1. Namely, Pr [Π(v0) = 1 in two rounds] = 0, by
almost pre-agreement and Pr [Π(v1) = 1 in two rounds] ≥ γ, by almost pre-agreement and
halting. It follows that 0 ≥ γ − 2(`+ 1)2 · (1− γ), by Equation 3, and thus 1− 12(`+1)2+1 ≥ γ,
which yields the desired expression.
2.3 Second-Round Halting – Public-Randomness Protocols
In Section 2.2, we ruled out “very good” second-round halting for arbitrary protocols via
an efficient locally consistent attack. Recall that if the halting probability is too good
(probability almost one), then there is a somewhat simple attack that violates agreement
and/or validity. In this subsection, we discuss ruling out any second-round halting, i.e.,
halting probability bounded away from zero, for public-randomness protocols.
We first explain why the attack – as is – does not rule out second-round halting. Suppose
that at the first round the parties of Π send a deterministic function of their input, and at the
second round they send the messages they received at the first round together with a uniform
random bit. On input v and randomness r, the parties are instructed not to halt at the second
round (i.e., carry on beyond the second round until they reach agreement with validity) if a
super-majority (≥ n− t) of the vi’s are in agreement and maj(r1, . . . , rn) 6= maj(v1, . . . , vn),
i.e., the majority of the random bits does not agree with the super-majority of the inputs.
In all other cases, the parties are instructed to output maj(r1, . . . , rn). It is not hard to see
that this protocol will halt with probability 1/2, even in the presence of the previous locally
consistent adversary (regardless of the choice of propagating parties Li). More generally,
if the randomness uniquely determines the output, the protocol designer can ensure that
halting does not result in disagreement, by partitioning the randomness appropriately, and
thus foiling the previous attack.8
To overcome the above apparent obstacle, we introduce another dimension to our locally
consistent attack; we instruct an extra set of corrupted parties to abort at the second round
without sending their second-round messages. By utilizing aborting parties, the adversary
can potentially decouple the output/halting from the parties’ randomness and thus either
prevent halting or cause disagreement. In Section 2.3.1, we explain how to rule out second-
round halting for a rather unrealistic class of public-randomness protocol. What makes the
class of protocols unrealistic is that we assume security holds against unbounded locally
consistent adversaries, and the protocol prescribes only a single bit of randomness per party
per round. That being said, this case illustrates nicely our attack, and it also makes an
interesting connection to Boolean functions analysis (namely, the KKL theorem [37]). For
general public-randomness protocols, we only know how to analyze the aforementioned attack
assuming Conjecture 5, as explained in Section 2.3.2.
8 In Section 2.2, halting was close to 1 and thus the randomness was necessarily ambiguous regarding the
output.
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2.3.1 “Superb” Single-Coin Protocols
A BA protocol Π is t-superb if agreement and validity hold perfectly against an adaptive
unbounded locally consistent adversary corrupting at most t parties, i.e., the probability
that such an adversary violates agreement or validity is 0. A public-randomness protocol is
single-coin, if, at any given round, each party samples a single unbiased bit.
I Theorem 7 (Second-round halting, superb single-coin protocols). For every ε > 0 there
exists c > 0 such that the following holds for large enough n. For t = (1/3 + ε) · n, let Π be
a t-superb, single-coin, n-party public-randomness Byzantine agreement protocol and let γ
denote the probability that the protocol halts in the second round under a locally consistent
attack. Then, γ ≤ n−c.
We assume for simplicity that the parties do not sample any randomness at the first
round, and write r ∈ {0, 1}n for the vector of bits sampled by the parties at the second
round, i.e., ri is a uniform random bit sampled by Pi.
As discussed above, our attack uses an additional set of corrupted parties of size σ · n,
dubbed the “aborting” parties and denoted S, that abort indiscriminately at the second round
(the value of σ is set to bε/4c and ` = 2 · d1/εe to accommodate for the new set of corrupted
parties, i.e., |Li| ≤ n · ε/2). In more detail, analogously to the previous analysis, we consider
(` + 1) · ( nσn) distinct variants of Π, denoted {ΠSi }i,S and indexed by i ∈ (`) and S ⊆ [n]
of size σn, as follows. In protocol ΠSi , parties in P send messages to L1, . . . ,Li according
to the input prescribed by v1, and to Li+1, . . . ,L` according to the input prescribed by v0
(recall that P is exactly those indices where v0 and v1 differ). Parties in S act according
to P or Lj , for the relevant j, except that they abort at the second round without sending
their second-round messages. We write ΠSi (r) = b to denote the event that the parties not in
P ∪ S output b, where the parties’ second-round randomness is equal to r. Let HaltSi denote
the event that all parties not in P ∪ S halt at the second round in an execution of ΠSi , and
define RSi (b) = {r ∈ {0, 1}n s.t. ΠSi (r) = b ∧ HaltSi }. The following holds:
Neighbouring executions (N2†): (5)
∀v0,v1 ∈ {0, 1}n with dist(v0,v1) ≤ n/3, ∀b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [`] ..= {1, . . . , `} :(
∀S : Pr
[
ΠSi−1 = b ∧ HaltSi−1
]
≥ γ/2
)
=⇒
(
∀S : Pr
[
ΠSi = b ∧ HaltSi
]
≥ γ/2
)
.
In words, for both b ∈ {0, 1}: if ΠSi−1 = b and halts in two rounds with large probability
(≥ γ/2), for every S, then ΠSi = b and halts in two rounds with large probability, for every S.
Before proving Equation 5, we show how to use it to derive Theorem 7. We apply Equation 5
for v0 = 0n−t1t, v1 = 0t1n−t, b = 0, and i = `, in combination with the properties of validity
and almost pre-agreement (Equation 1). Namely, by these properties, a random execution
of Π on input v0 where the parties in S abort at the second round yields output 0 with
probability at least γ/2, for every S ∈ ([n]σn). Therefore, by Equation 5, we deduce that a
random execution of Π on input v1 where the parties in S abort at the second round yields
output 0 with probability at least γ/2, for every S ∈ ([n]σn). The latter violates either validity
or almost pre-agreement – contradiction. To conclude the proof of Theorem 7, we prove
Equation 5 by using the following corollary of the seminal KKL theorem [37] from Bourgain
et al. [11]. (Recall that R|S is the projection of R on the index-set S.)
I Lemma 8. For every σ, δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists c > 0 s.t. the following holds for large
enough n. Let R ⊆ {0, 1}n be s.t. |R|S | ≤ (1 − δ) · 2(1−σ)n, for every S ⊆ [n] of size σn.
Then, |R| ≤ n−c · 2n.
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Loosely speaking, Lemma 8 states that for a set R ⊆ {0, 1}n, if the size of every projection
on a constant fraction of indices is bounded away from one (in relative size), then the size of
R is vanishingly small (again, in relative size).9
Going back to the proof, in pursuit of contradiction, let i ≥ 1 denote the smallest index
for which Equation 5 does not hold, and without loss of generality suppose b = 0, i.e., there
exists S such that |RSi (0)| < γ/2 · 2n, and |RS
′
i−1(0)| ≥ γ/2 · 2n, for every relevant S ′. We
prove Equation 5 by proving Equations 6 and 7, which result in contradiction via Lemma 8.
Halting: |RSi (1)| ≥ γ/2 · 2n (6)
Perfect agreement: ∀S ′ : |RSi (1)|S′ | ≤ (1− γ/2) · 2(1−σ)n (7)
Equation 6 follows by the halting property of ΠSi , since the execution halts if and only
if r ∈ RSi (1) ∪ RSi (0), and, by assumption, |RSi (0)| < γ/2 · 2n. To conclude, we prove
Equation 7 by observing that for every S ′ and b ∈ {0, 1}, and every r and r′, if r ∈ RS′i−1(0)
and r|S′ = r′|S′ , then r′ ∈ RS
′
i−1(0) (by definition), i.e., membership to RS
′
i−1(0) does not
depend on the indices of S ′. It follows that |RSi−1(0)|S′ | ≥ γ/2 · 2(1−σ)n, for every S ′,
and therefore |RSi (1)|S′ | ≤ (1 − γ/2) · 2(1−σ)n, since the sets RSi (1)|S′ and RSi−1(0)|S′ are
non-intersecting for every S ′. Otherwise, if RSi (1)|S′ ∩ RSi−1(0)|S′ 6= ∅, then the following
attack violates the superb quality of the protocol. Fix S ′ and r such that r ∈ RSi (1) and
r|S′ ∈ RSi (1)|S′ ∩ RSi−1(0)|S′ , and consider the attacker controlling P, Li, S, and S ′ that
sends messages according to ΠSi and ΠS
′
i−1 to C0 and C1, respectively, where {C0, C1} is an
arbitrary partition of C = [n] \ P ∪ Li ∪ S ∪ S ′. It is not hard to see the attacker violates
agreement, whenever the randomness lands on r.
I Remark 9. For superb, single-coin, public-randomness protocol, repeated application of
Equation 2 and Lemma 8 rules out second-round halting for arbitrary (constant) fraction of
corrupted parties (and not only n/3 fraction).
2.3.2 General (Public-Randomness) Protocols
The analysis above crucially relies on the superb properties of the protocol. While it can be
generalized for protocols with near-perfect statistical security and constant-bit randomness, we
only manage to analyze the most general case (i.e., protocols with non-perfect computational
security and arbitrary-size randomness) assuming Conjecture 5. Very roughly (and somewhat
inaccurately), when applying the above attack on general public-randomness protocols, the
following happens for some δ > 0 and both values of b ∈ {0, 1}: for (1−δ)-fraction of possible
aborting subsets S, the probability that the honest parties halt in two rounds and output
the same value b, whether parties in S all abort or not, is bounded below by the halting
probability. Assuming Conjecture 5, it follows that with probability δ over the randomness
and S, the honest parties under the attack output opposite values depending whether the
parties in S abort or not. We conclude that the agreement of the protocol is at most δ.
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